Suggestions for the definition of our core terms

* Development
* Sustainability
* Resources
* Gender
* Leadership
* Power
* Participation
* Empowerment
* Trust and Mistrust

Preliminary Remark / Introductory Note

We would like to present definitions which have a direct action relevance. Therefore, all of the following definitions try to take into account an „I" and a „you" perspective: in the cases where it is possible to express what "I" expect of myself and for myself, and for you and from you, it will be easier to bridge the gap to the thinking of local interlocutors. "My" questions are then more easily related to the interlocutors' own experience and notions. Therefore, their replies should be more directly comparable to "our" definitions, as well as to each other[1].

All of the following definitions are at the same time an attempt to formulate questions the answers to which will make it easier to compare results from different projects on one side, and on the other to compare „our" scientific understanding with „their" local understanding of the core concepts and

This approach takes into account the trend towards a constructivist understanding of society: the „social" (norms and language rules as much as a shared understanding of word and terms, even social structure itself) has to be "re-enacted" anew in all social encounters. The "social" – the "between people" – has to be *produced* through (inter-)action.

One possible objection to such a sweeping statement is the argument that in fact not all people are involved in such negotiations to the same degree, and that those who actually participate in processes of negotation about social facts do not have equal chances of making their voices heard or getting their interests taken into account – and it is possible to claim that this unequal access to processes of negotiation and unequal influence on the results of these negotiations is precisely what constitutes the "hard" structure of "society", the roots of which are ultimately to be found in the uneqal distribution of power. This is true on condition that one accepts so see control over things and information as forms of power. Giddens and Bourdieu have contributed to softening the conception of society as a "hard" structure which dominated sociological thinking for a long time. They and others pointed out that to exclude people from decisions about actions and defitions also requires action – in an active form from those who want to exclude others, and in the form of acceptance by those who are excluded. Of course, this can be called acceptance or submission only to the exent that the excluded are aware of the exclusion: whenever a decision about exclusion is based on a secret negotiation necessitating a meeting at a certain place and between certain people within power structures, the talk of "hard"

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[1] The reader should be aware of the intense discussion which followed the suggestion to include an "I" – "You" perspective into these defintions: the author was reminded that the sharp distinction between "I" and "you" is often not applicable in Non-Western societies

structures is justified. Even in such cases, however, securing the exclusivity of access to information requires *action*: the confidentiality of information has to be protected against the curiosity of the public.

Development

Seen from the „I"-perspective, development means that something grows. Something with which "I" am connected, something which connects me with other people and other things. I am involved in this "unfolding" and it enriches both myself and the others. It is a shared process which connects and involves "us." That this aspect of connecting and involving is important is shown by the appreciation for all kinds of transport and infrastructure all over the world – and this is independent of any explicit mentioning of this aspect in the local discourse

This process of development offers something to all of us. In the context of this involvement and connection we are offered opportunities for action, and experience an anhancement of our potencies for expression, for enjoyment, for consumption, and for production.

It appears that this positive evaluation of development is shared all over the world. In this appreciation as well as in the expectations directed at "development" a "more" of things, of connections, of knowledge, of entertainment is always implied. In this sense, development is, without doubt, linked to growth - is unthinkable without a notion of growth. Since growth is imagined to be of a kind to somehow profit "all of us," this positive image of development does not make a distinction between the "I" and the "You" perspective. (Implicitly this is also true for the kind of growth envisaged by systems theory which postulated in increase in complexity as a criterion for societal developmnt: the complexity of the environment is "reduced" through inner differentiation which allows for more varied, yet adequate responses of the system to the environmental complexity, thus stabilizing the system itself).

The unpleasant realization that cancer also develops through growth finds a parallel in the sociological / economical observation that economic growth is accompanied by destructive processes in the areas of ecology (exhaustion of natural resources and environmental pollution). Where these processes occur, they are also observed – or suffered: all over the world, people who are displaced by dam projects or other huge development projects see themselves as (more or less powerless) "victims of development." While the hope for participation in the doubtless benefits of development dominate (particularly in conversations with Western visitors), the fear of being "rolled over" are equally well documented.

Therefore it seems to be important to pay attention to indications of these two opposing expectations of future events in the process of collecting data: the hope that innovations will be tools for "positive growth" may be as present as the fear of innovations as tools of destruction, or "negative growth." Only the collected data themselves can reveal, which social group leans towards one or the other of these attitudes, and what kinds of information or experiences led to these expectations of the future. To approach data collection with this kind of sensitivity for signs of opposing trends may enable to find answers to an intriguing questions: did negative experiences produce a manner of thinking which parallels the modern discourse on sustainability? In the sense that the costs of

growth and development are taken into consideration? This is linked to another prominent question in the international discourse: how and to what extent can the actual distribution of costs and benefits be reconciled with – or justified by – existing notions of fairness or justice?

Sustainability

The notion of sustainability may be applied to quite different things, actions, and relationships. What these different applications have in common is the hope that a present state or process (which contributes to an improvement of a negative state) can be sustained into the future – ideally into a very far future. The aim is to be able to *rely* on this extension of the present into the future. The thinking turns around creating the conditions which I myself and others have to fulfil or comply with for this reliability or dependability to exist.

More than other core notions, sustainability requires the distinction between the "I pespective" and the "you perspective": depending on who the "you" is, "I" face different perspectives and consequences. The fundamental question is: to what exent does *my* attempt to be able to *rely* on an improvement of my circumstances of life and my chances for self-realization influence *your* chances to do the same, i.e. to *rely* on improvements or potencies for improvement?

The question is whether the means – i.e. the *resources* - which "I" need *now* for the creation of the conditions of my *future* "ability to rely" are
1) available on a sustainable basis (which refers to the distinction between "weak" and "strong" sustainability: "strong sustainability" requires that we only use the "interest" and not the "capital" itself – which means that the use of non-renewable resources will have to be reduced to zero in the long run), and
2) available equally to everyone: competition (particularly for non-renewable and limited resources) and inequality of distribution make it difficult to create sustainable social relationships. Because you cannot really rely on competitors and adversaries – and, historically, ideological justifications for a factually unequal distribution of resource have always failed sooner or later. I therefore do not see any realistic way of establishing any such justification as sustainable in the sense of "permanently reliable." Some day somebody will point out the discrepancy between ideological equality and factual inequality, start working for a narrowing of this discrepancy, find supporters for this work – and in this manner start or continue a power struggle.

What seems to be new in terms of history is the awareness that the future competitors for non-renewable resources will be the coming generations – our own children and grandchildren. And therefore "we" are responsible towards them. Seen from the point of view of competition – from the "you perspective" – "they" are simply adversaries. And they are powerless adversaries who have no choice but to take whatever is left over. Seen from the perspective of the existence of the human species, however, "they" are the only "guarantee" that "our" form of existence – our work, our creation, our way of thinking – will continue. We are the ones who are responsible that they inherit the preconditions for doing that.

Resources

In general terms, resources are the means with the help of which goals can be achieved. At this level of generality this comprises "things" as much as "forces" as much as living beings. "Natural resources" are both things and forces in the environment – to which magic forces may belong next to wind and water.

From the „I" perspective one has to ask: "Which benefits can I obtain from these things and forces?" – and: "What do I have to do or take care of in order to maintain that benefit?" At this level of generality, and seen from the perspective of action, there is no substantial difference between a scientific orientation (which demands attention to the inherent characteristics of materials and forces) and a magical orientation (which demands attention to the will of spirits whose permission is needed, in addition to practical knowledge about the characteristics of materials).

In other words: The "reduction" of things, living beings and humans to their usefulness – which critics of modernity have bemoaned as one of its faults – is also part of the everyday life of any "pre-modern" or "underdeveloped[2]" group of people. While, conversely, at least some researcher who consider themselves as both scientific and modern, explicitly incorporate spiritual or "magical" aspects of the world into their empirical questions. Probably the best known of these researchers is Rupert Sheldrake.

These remarks aim at smoothing the way for a realistic and empirical comparison of so-called "traditional" and so-called "modern" attitudes and orientations. The proposition is to view the differences against the background of a basic similarity of the range of attitudes a human mind can possibly adopt. Put differently: The differences and similarities in attitudes and mental orientations documented in the recordings of conversational material on one hand, and the differences and similarities between these and those of our own scientific understanding of our core notions on the other hand, might allow to assess whether the – often unconsciously held – conviction of "modern" people is correct: that their "frame of mind" is somehow more advanced, more "developed."

At this point I would like to moot the question whether such an assessment of the modern self-conception – which has played a central role in development efforts all over the world – is possible without personally questioning this self-conception in earnest. It is questionable whether it is possible – without such questioning - to show sufficient respect for local opinions and attitudes for their *authentic* self-representation. For this respect there surely exist forms of language which can be learnt and reproduced. Almost *any* human being will, however, judge the *credibility* of such linguistic expression of respect separately – on the basis of non-linguistic criteria held to be recognizable

Gender

What is the difference between seeing the world as a man or as a woman? Which courses of action and / or roles are accessible to me as a woman or a man, respectively? What do I

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[2] While the word has come to be avoided, its meaning seems to be living on in many minds: how can one doubt the veracity of the grand evolutionary scheme leading from pre-human and pre-history to human and historical, and within history from "simple" and "rural" to "complex" and "industrialised"?

expect from the other sex by way of support or objection / resistance with respect to those courses of action and / or roles?

We should, however, be aware of the fact that some societies provide gender roles which do not fit the simple scheme of man – woman. And we should clarify whether such alternative gender roles play a role in our research areas.

There are three areas of everyday life to which we need to pay particular attention with respect to gender-specific roles and interpretations: 1) access to and use of resources; 2) access to and action in organizations / instituions; and 3) access to and use of power.

Hence: How do „I" as a man think about the relationship to resources? Which resources do I use as a "man"? To the use of which resources are women entitled in my opinion? Conversely: Which resources do "I" use as a "woman" and which do men use according to my opinion?

Is there a difference in the *type (manner)* of access and the *type (manner)* of use?

Which organisations relevant to resource use do I have access to as a man or as a woman? Which are the specific roles women and men play in these organizations / institutions? Which role or function does the organization have with respect to the use of resources? How do these organizations define their relation to other organizations / institutions? What is the organization's / institution's self-assessment of its own sustainability? What is their contribution for – or against – the sustainability of "livelihood strategies"?

What kind of power position – or what kind of power – am I entitled to as a woman or man, respectively? How and for what purpose do "I" – *can "I"* – use such position or kind of power? How do "I" come to terms with people holding such positions as a "woman" or "man" respetively? (For different options of "leadership" see below)

Leadership

Leadership always presupposes one (or more) identifiable person(s), whose voice has a greater weight than that of others – the "followers." For our project the main question seems to be: Are there people who are more or less unambiguously identified as "leaders" by others? How are they perceived by the others? Are these leaders considered legitimate and are they respected – or are they seen as mere figureheads to whom people only pay lipservice? And if they are acknowledged as real leaders: Do people follow their word out of respect and with understanding, or out of fear, i.e. with a feeling of being forced to?

These questions aim to differentiate between the actual power potency embodied in a certain leader (the "size" of this potency to actually *realize / achieve* set goals), and the "quality" of this leadership (for more details see the section on "Power – Sustainability – Natural Resources" [*"Macht- Nachhaltigkeit – Natürliche Ressourcen"*] in the Report *Lore Lindu und die umgebenden Gemeinden*). *Leadership* is always *personalized* power, whilst power as a general phenomenon (see below) also comprises impersonal mechanisms of action which are "materialized" in *structures*.

Power

The questions from the „I" and "You" perspectives might be:

What do I actually do when I use power? Under which conditions do I "have" power? What do I do when I am confronted with – or submitted to - power?

In very general terms, „power" has two aspects / faces – a *real* one and an *imaginary* one:

1) Power in the aspect of something that factually *exists* and produces effects – power as *effectuating*: As the capacity to *do* something, to achieve a goal; in this sense power is that which enables someone to achieve what s/he wants to achieve. In this sense power is not sharply differentiated from "ability" – and it is not restricted to relationships between people.

2) Power as an attribution, as an imagination of what should be: What *should* happen, if a power holder attempts to realize a set goal? What should happen if others oppose the achievement of this goal – or passively refuse collaboration?

Power has to „dimensions": a "size" (the size of the potency to achieve set aims) and a "quality" (which is the relationship between enforcement via the use of means of power on one hand, and acceptance or legitimacy on the other. Alternatively, one could describe it as the balance between "degrading the other to a mere means" on the one hand, and "involve the other's own potency" on the other. See also the quotation from the report *Lore Lindu und die umgebenden Gemeinden* below).

In addition, power has two forms of appearance – it can appear as a real potency (or as a characteristic of a structure), and it can appear as directly expressed in interactions.

The six aspects mentioned above should not be conceptualized as a precisely definable coordinate system with three axes, which would allow to "measure" power accurately: Power is always *both* "real" *and* "imagined" at the same time – with respect to its "potency" as much as with respect to its "quality." In addition, the real and the imagined aspect cannot be clearly separated – neither on the "axis" of "emergence in concrete interactions" versus "real potency", nor on the axis "quality" versus "potency": To the extent that power can do something *to me* against my will, it is real – but at the same time there is always the imagination of what it *could* do which influences my actions. That such imagination really mirrors concrete instructions for action and concrete threats of sanctions seems to be a rare exception.

Quote from the report *Lore Lindu und die umgebenden Gemeinden*

The notion of power used here conceptualizes power as a "potency" for achieving goals. This potency can neither be fully accounted for by the position within a social or organizational structure (the "authority" bestowed on position holders), nor by the availability of means of power. Because this potency also depends on the willingness of those who are involved in the achievement of the goals to actually accept the role intended for them or to tolerate the intended outcomes.

Therefore, the *size* of this potency would depend on the available means of power on one hand, and on the social relation (acceptance or legitimacy) on the other. Hence, power has

two dimensions: its potency or strength , and its "quality" which is determined by the balance between force (application of coercion) and acceptance (legitimacy). For illustrative purposes, let us take an inhabitant of the village of Toro: the difference between him renouncing to go and collect *rattan* in the forest because he fears the police, and renouncing to collect *rattan* because of his feeling of belongingness to a community which has decided on a measure of self-restraint for the sake of the generations to come – this difference should not be overlooked, even if the visible result of a stop to *rattan*-collection is the same. According to this model of "quality" is is also important to distinguish between an acceptance of community rules for fear of losing face (rather than incurring traditional sanctions), and an acceptance on account of the trust placed in the *Lembaga Adat's* decisions: that these decisions are taken for the common good, even if one does not understand the reasoning.

Furthermore, the „strength" of power - defined as the potency for achieving goals - also depends on the definition of these goals: the relation between a goal and the situation in which this goal is supposed to be achieved, this relationship in itself contains a potency – a potency which Solesbury, with reference to the rise to prominence of the "Sustainable livelihoods approach" (SLA) in the DFID[3] called "the right statement at the right moment" (Solesbury 2003), and which a Chinese figure of thought calls the "propensity of things[4]." Demanding the impossible will render even the most powerful (wo)man powerless. I do not consider this point trivial, because the appropriateness of goals plays is equally important in everyday life and in development planning: inappropriate goals necessarily lead to disappointments. Disappointments which grow with the intensity of the efforts to achieve the inappropriate aim. Disappointments which could have been avoided by a more realistic perception of the situation, and more knowledge.

By way of an example (according to a second-hand report): the advocacy NGO working in the village of *Katu* might have avoided being thrown out of the village, had they not insisted that the megaliths in the vicinity of the village demonstrate the age of the settlement, and can therefore be used as an argument against the proposed resettlement of that village – while the villagers themselves had always claimed that they had no idea whatsoever about the origin of these megaliths, and that these megaliths had never played any role for the villagers's activities and sense of identity. According to the report, the GO activists were driven away because people did not want to be lectured any more about the megaliths.

This model of power acknowledges that the things and people who figure in the objectives, as much as the things and people who become means in achieving these objectives, possess their own tendencies or potencies. Success in integrating these potencies into the definition of goals and into the deployment of the means will increase the chances for actually achieving these goals – and hence the *power*.

Accepting this view of „power" one may become somewhat detached from the concept of power as the potency to *overpower* - which deprives those overpowered of any alternative to submission – as the *only* option to understand power. As first suggested by Hannah Ahrendt, one may instead begin to perceive – and appreciate - the active and voluntary contribution of the less powerful: power is not just "taken from above" but also "given from below". And this does not only happen in democracies.

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[3] Department for International Development of the Government of Great Britain
[4] This is how Jullien (1999) translates the Chinese sign *shi* into English

This concept of power will also facilitate a more precise assessment of the sustainability of interventions: the more they take tendencies and potencies of the given situation into account, the higher their chances to take root in these situations – the higher their chances to have a sustainable effect without depending on a sustained use of means of power.

Participation

Let us begin with the root meaning of participation: to "have a share (in)[5]. – When do I feel that I have a share in something? What do "I" expect of "you", if you participate in something? Does this expectation depend on gender?

„I" feel that I have a share (that I am a "stakeholder") when I can participate already in the setting of the goals to be achieved later - the bottom line being the knowledge that my voice is heard. This applies equally to situations where the envisaged objective addresses a concrete problem (in which case "my voice" should have participated in defining that problem – to the extent that "my voice" can contribute something of relevancy), and to situations where the objective represents a desire for a change in a positive direction . a desire for an innovation or even for a step towards some kind of "utopia." "I" *need* this sense of being involved (of my "voice", or my knowledge, or my opinions, or my interests, or my wishes being involved), in order to really "invest" my energies – and resources – into the engagement for the achievement of these collaboratively defined objectives. And "I" expect the same of "you."

This does not mean that participation presupposes the acceptance of the principle that "all are equal." It is possible that more or less all members of a given society accept the legitimacy of activities and projects being initiated by the local leaders – and the legitimacy of the leader's expectation that everybody will follow and contribute. "Participation" and "following" are probably not separated as clearly as our common (Western) understanding of participation as a "bottom-up" approach would suggest.

Equally important is the acknowledgement that „participation" is not restricted to "progressive" aims: while some people participate in the defence of a status quo, others may participate in "change." And this change can mean either an improvement of the given situation – a "development" – or a worsening of that situation (cf. the above-mentioned negative effects of "development" projects).

The positive meaning of participation is that *all* who are affected share in the elaboration of the objectives of an action, a project, a programme. Those who are *affected* – the "stakeholders" – are those who act, those at whom this action aims (the *target group*), those who benefit from that action (the *beneficiaries*), *and* they are those who are in any way affected by the outcomes of that action. Therefore, one of the important steps in participatory measures – next to shared problem definition and shared setting of goals - is a shared investigation of the networks of relationships between different actors and between actors and those affected: only on the basis of such collaborative analysis of the consequences of the planned actions for different individuals and / or groups is it possible to weigh the chances of a shared consensus versus the chances of emerging conflicts. Should the balance tip towards emerging conflicts, such shared analysis allows to pre-estimate who will be the supporters and who will be the opponents. In case conflicts are

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[5] According to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*

likely – in the case of the Lore Lindu National Park: between conservationists and landless people- such shared analysis may allow for a more open negotiation, for a resolution of such conflicts through mediation, rather than through fighting.

Empowerment

For „me" (or for „us") *empowerment* first of all means that "I / we" can achieve more of what " I / we" want to achieve – i.e. the capacity for action increases, and with it the "power" in the sense of the definition suggested above. The causes for this increased capacity for action may be varied: physical training, skills training, increasing knowledge through learning, enhancing confidence and courage. The increased capacity for action may also stem from an improvement in the chances and abilities for co-operative action – which allows for individual skills, knowledge and power to work together instead of against each other. And finally, the increased capactiy for action may be come from abolishing restrictions or explicit bans which stood in the way of realizing a potential for action already present.

Wolfgang Stark – presently the most prominent proponent of „empowerment" in the field of psycho-social work in Germany – gives the following definition:

„Empowerment may be understood as a continuous, purposive and goal-oriented process within small, mostly local societies. This process comprises mutual respect and care, critical reflection and becoming aware on the part of the actors – which enables the participation of individuals and groups who lack adequate access to important social resources. The process improves their access and allows them more control over these important resources." (STARK 1996: 16 f.)

Empowerment may be understood as a process for an individual, for several individuals, for a group of people in relation to other groups – and it may be looked at as psychological, a social, or a political process:

„Empowerment is a multilevel construct, including:
  * ***personal power*** incorporating the concept of self efficacy and *the development of basic skills*
  * ***social power*** *or the ability to influence others and*
  * ***political power***, *or the ability of influence the allocation of social and economic resources*" (SCHULZ AND NELSON, zitiert nach HAGMANN 1999, S. 49)

The straightforward link to "social power" and to the competition for resources points to the possibility that empowerment may mean something very different for "me / us" and for "you" – depending on the extent to which the different parties involved had already been working in the same direction, or, on the contrary, had been adversaries. Co-operation always implies a win-win-situation for all those involved – at least if it means not just a sharing of the benefits, but also a sharing of the investments into the necessary efforts. If, however, the empowerment process aims at assisting people hithertho excluded from access to resources and from decision-making – in the tradition of Paolo Freire (1973) -, then "our benefit" will often be "your loss". While this is *necessarily* true when it comes to the use of scarce resources, the situation looks different when it comes to the sharing of processes of decision-making.

There is the paradox, that the *sharing* or *handing over* of power – the *disempowerment* of "uppers" in the terminology of Robert Chambers – may in fact imply an increase in power for the one who delegates part of his power: if the sharing leads to improved co-operation and to an increased willingness on the part of the "recipients" of this power-sharing to invest more of their own knowledge, engagement, and creativity into the effort to achieve agreed objectives. Empowerment *can* be a process which benefits *all* – even if they are the apparent adversaries in a power struggle. The precondition for this is a situation which allows for an alternative to a zero-sum game, in which there is necessarily a loser. Hence, competition for obviously limited resources shows little promise for such alternatives.

Referring to access to arable land, STIEFEL and WOLFE concluded in 1994: "For the most part, organized efforts by peasants represent self-defense against development more than participation in development" (STIEFEL and WOLFE 1994: 240).

The goal of *disempowerment* is "to enable powerful people to recognize that power is not a commodity to be amassed, but a resource to be shared, and … to enable them to gain satisfaction, fulfilment and even fun, from disempowering themselves and empowering others" (CHAMBERS 1998: xvi).

On several occasions the most important proponents of participation in the global development discourse noted that a precondition for this positive paradox to materialize is a change in the attitude of the „uppers" – and in the attitude of those who initiate this process:

„Empowerment of the poor requires reversals and changes of role. In PRA this has come to be recognized as more important than the methods." (CHAMBERS IN NELSON AND WRIGHT 1997, p.39)

„The participants at the IDS workshop were adamant that a fundamental feature for the process of institutionalizing participatory approaches is to explore the behaviour and attitudes of those individuals engaged in such a process. All chapters in this book touch on this theme." (BLACKBURN and HOLLAND 1998, p.4)

„Two strong working conclusions stand out as basic and likely to last. They are that:
- sustained participation indevelopment demands transformations in three domains: methods and procedures; institutional cultures; and personal behaviour and attitudes. All there are needed. Each reinforces the others. Each represents points of entry for change.
- Of these, personal behaviour and attitudes are crucial. Participation is abou how people interact. Dominating behaviour inhibits participation. Democratic behaviour to enable and empower encourages it. For those with power and authority to adopt non-dominating, empowering behaviour almost always entails personal change." (CHAMBERS, in BLACKBURN AND HOLLAND 1998, p. XV)

The authors claim global relevance for these conclusions:

„All this means that the new challenges for the twenty-first century face the rich and powerful more than the poor and weak, for the yconcern reversals, giving things up. For the rich to give up their wealth, without being forced by countervailing power, is difficult and improbable; but for uppers to give up dominance at the personal level, putting respect in place of superiority, becoming a convenor, and provider of occasions, a facilitator and

catalyst, a consultant and support, is less difficult: for these roles bring with them many satisfactions and non-material rewards. Perhaps one of the bigges opportunities now is to enable more and more uppers to experience those satisfactions personally, and then themselves to spread them, upwards, downwards, and laterally to their peers. For participation, in the full empowering sense of reversals, is not for one place or one set of people, but is itself a paradigm – a pattern of ideas, values, methods and behaviour – which can apply to almost all social activity and spread in all directions." (CHAMBERS in NELSON AND WRIGHT 1997, p. 42)

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Trust and Mistrust

It seems to me that trust and mistrust cannot be considered separately. They may – or they may not – represent opposite poles in a spectrum of attitudes one may harbour towards other people: in any case it is important for all relationships to what extent doubt, fear, hope, and sympathy are present. The difficulty of exactly mapping the relationships between these elements is made clear by paying attention to instances when one advises oneself to "be on guard" – in which case one believes to have trusted too much – or when one admits to oneself of having been overcautious – which means that one has trusted too little, or mistruested too much.

In the light of such experiences it seems that the mental assessment of how much trust or mistrust vis-à-vis a certain person is adequate, may diverge from the complex cognitive *and* emotional processes towards that person which are at work simultaneously. Actual experiences may for the first time make oneself aware of the existence of long-held stable attitudes – and possibly fundamentally question them.

This aspect is important for conversation analysis, because both trust and mistrust may form a sort of stable background attitude – and therefore remain unexpressed and hence unobservable: what all participants have in common without questioning does not need to be explicitly displayed. For this reason answers to the following questions will in all likelihood have to be derived indirectly, i.e. via the comparison of different constellations of interaction. The exception to this rule might be conversations about conflicts,

particularly when these conflicts came as a surprise to the participants themselves. The sensation of surprise itself indicates that self-understood, unquestioned expectations have been violated. Should we succeed in recording such conversations, replaying these recordings to the participants as a basis for a collaborative reflection on the meaning of that situation might offer a route to a better understanding. In such an explorative reflection the following questions might serve as suggestions for routes to explore.

What does it mean to trust or to trust someone? How does one feel when one trusts, what does one expect if one trusts, and under what conditions does one start trusting? Conversely: how does one feel if one does *not* trust (if one mistrusts), what does one expect if one mistrusts, and under what conditions does one start to mistrust? In all likelihood it is also important to always consider *whom* one trust or mistrusts, and with respect to *which statements, promises, actions*.

An essential characteristic of trust seems to be absence of doubt, a feeling of being untroubled or at ease. This allows a more direct expression of opinions and a more open pursuit of goals. Attitudes of trust demand less psychological energy – the the truster *and* of the trusted. In this respect trust indeed functions as a "generalised medium of communication" which "reduces social complexity", as Luhmann claimed (LUHMANN 1973/1989).

Mistrust, on the other hand, demands additional efforts in order to appease doubts which one either cannot shrug off or which one considers necessary. Mistrust also serves as a security against potential losses or injuries: only *after* the doubts have been cleared away by additional information is the more relaxed state of "relying-on" reached.

Sociologists accord this mechanism a prominent place for the functioning of societies under the name of "systemic trust" – meaning that the members of a society trust in the functioning of the mechanisms and institutions of their society. Hence the institutionalization of control mechanisms – of mechanisms of distrust – are important in creating trust in the system. One of the currently prominent examples are independent electoral commisions in countries with a shaky track record in democratic elections.

The distinction between personal trust and systemic trust made in scholarly works carries some weight because it is connected to hypotheses about the evolution of "modernity" – which are also important for our own research project. Sociologists such as Anthony Giddens claim that "modern" society develops from "traditional" society via the dissolution of closely-knit social groups in which trust develops through intimacy, while compensating for this loss through a more generalized trust in the functioning of organizations and institutions – the "systemic trust." SHARMA (2001) gives a rather convincing account the widespread distrust existing in a traditional Indian village – demonstrating that even under these conditions *trust* is a rare phenomenon which has to be maintained through purposeful actions.

I wold like to cite the following definition from the literature:

"Trust is the *conviction* that others will do – or not do – certain things. The trusting person knows that the actions of those whom s/he trusts may affect his/her well-being, and hence trust implies *risk*. Trust is a consciously fallible *ex-ante* assumption which abides by the following logic: >I know that it *may* happen, but I do not believe that it *will* happen<, with the >it< being an unwanted event caused by the other – trusted – person. The dynamics of

the creation of trust may be represented along a time axis. As soon as the necessary and sufficient conditions are in place, trust is a state of equilibrium which tends to reproduce itself. The perception of predictability, consistency and stability in the behaviour of the relevant other are all part of this equilibrium. … Whoever trusts, should continue to adhere to shared values and convictions, and s/he will do so at best, unless irritating events and perceptions cause the actor to review his/her decision about whom to trust and to what extent and with respect to which issues. In the absence of such irritating events a relationship of trust is self-reinforcing." (CLAUS OFFE, "Trust and Knowledge, Rules and Decisions: Exöloring a Difficult Conceptual Terrain", manuscript of a speech delivered at the conference "Democracy and Trust", Georgetown University, Washington DC, 7-9 Nov. 1996, cited from EISENSTADT 2001: 334)

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